European nations substitute between employment protection regulations and labor market expenditures (e.g., unemployment insurance benefits) for providing worker insurance. Employment regulations more directly tax firms making frequent labor adjustments than other labor insurance mechanisms. Venture capital and private equity investors are especially sensitive to these labor adjustment costs. Nations favoring labor expenditures as the mechanism for providing worker insurance developed stronger private equity markets in high volatility sectors over 1990-2004. These patterns are further evident in US investments into Europe. In this context, policy mechanisms are more important than the overall insurance level provided. Abstract European nations substitute between employment protection regulations and labor market expenditures (e.g., unemployment insurance bene…ts) for providing worker insurance. Employment regulations more directly tax …rms making frequent labor adjustments than other labor insurance mechanisms. Venture capital and private equity investors are especially sensitive to these labor adjustment costs. Nations favoring labor expenditures as the mechanism for providing worker insurance developed stronger private equity markets in high volatility sectors over 1990-2004. These patterns are further evident in US investments into Europe. In this context, policy mechanisms are more important than the overall insurance level provided.
Introduction
We examine how di¤erences in labor regulations across European countries in ‡uence the development of private equity (PE) markets, comprised of venture capital and buy-out investors. Recent theoretical models predict that countries with stricter labor policies will specialize in less innovative activities due to the higher worker turnover frequently associated with rapidly changing sectors (e.g., Saint-Paul 1997 , 2002a Samaniego 2006 ). We provide the …rst empirical evidence for this prediction at the industry level in the entrepreneurial …nance literature. In the process, we also make a methodological contribution by demonstrating how jointly modelling the di¤erent policies for providing worker insurance delivers more consistent results than their individual relationships. Our techniques may …nd application in other settings, too.
We …rst observe that European countries empirically substitute between employment protection regulations (EPRs) and labor market expenditures (LMEs) in the provision of worker insurance. Figure 1 shows the cross-sectional relationship for 1998. The vertical axis documents the average LMEs per capita taken from the OECD Social Expenditures database. LMEs include both active and passive policies designed to facilitate job creation and transitions, with the majority of expenditures being unemployment insurance bene…ts. The horizontal axis provides an EPR index developed by the OECD. Higher EPR scores indicate more heavily regulated labor markets, factoring in a wide variety of legislation concerning the individual and collective dismissals of both temporary and regular workers.
This plot illustrates two important features. First, Anglo-Saxon countries provide lower worker insurance on both dimensions than Continental Europe. These di¤erences in absolute levels of worker insurance provided by nations have been a frequent political-economy topic since at least de Tocqueville (e.g., Alesina et al. 2001 , Kerr 2007 . Second, the trend line, which is calculated only for Continental European nations, indicates that economies with higher LMEs per capita have weaker EPRs. These di¤erences in the mechanisms used to provision worker insurance among Continental European nations has received less attention. Denmark provides the highest LMEs per capita but has the second-lowest employment protection in Continental Europe. This re ‡ects the well-publicized Danish ' ‡exicurity' approach that emphasizes high job mobility facilitated by generous out-of-work bene…ts and active labor market programs to promote worker re-entry. Portugal, on the other hand, provides strong security to the employed but weaker bene…ts to the unemployed.
While employment protection and transition/re-entry assistance are perhaps substitutes for providing worker security, they have di¤erent implications for the costs …rms face. Labor rigidities have a stronger impact on the adjustment margins of …rms, especially those undertaking substantial restructurings. Even if general corporate or payroll taxation is higher to support 1 LMEs, the direct incidence on the labor adjustments that …rms wish to make is weaker in regimes favoring LMEs than in strict employment protection regimes. These taxes on labor adjustments are particularly pertinent for PE investments, which thrive in dynamic industries that require frequent labor adjustments. This PE focus on high-growth opportunities and rapid restructuring is necessary for achieving su¢ cient returns when portfolio companies o¤er the potential for exceptional investment returns but also carry a high risk of failure.
Combining these observations, nations emphasizing LMEs over employment protection should be more attractive for the development of PE …nancing, even after conditioning on the level of worker insurance provided. While labor market regulations do not speci…cally target the portfolio companies of PE investors, these investors are seeking opportunities that are generally more sensitive to these taxes on labor adjustment. We investigate this hypothesis using PE surveys provided by the European Private Equity and Venture Capital Association and Venture Economics. Figures 2 and 3 show that policy choices are correlated with PE placement (trend lines are still for Continental Europe). European countries with stricter employment protection have lower PE investments per capita, while those favoring LMEs are more attractive to these …nancial forms.
While these correlations are suggestive, many other factors vary across countries besides labor market policies, and it is quite likely that omitted factors correlated with labor policies are important for PE formation. Labor market policies tend to evolve slowly in most countries, limiting the scope of panel estimation techniques at the country level for disentangling these e¤ects. We thus test these predictions using a di¤erences-in-di¤erences approach similar to Rajan and Zingales (1998) that employs country-sector variation in PE market size over the 1990-2004 period. We speci…cally model whether countries that favor LMEs over employment protection for providing worker insurance develop relatively stronger PE markets in more volatile sectors. We calculate the volatility of sectors using US establishment-level data from the Census Bureau, which we take to be the unconstrained case.
Regression estimates …nd that the interaction of sector volatility and employment protection has a negative e¤ect on PE formation, while the opposite is true for LMEs. While suggestive of labor regulations having an important bite, the coe¢ cients are sometimes of borderline economic and statistical importance. As a methodological contribution, we show that the coe¢ cients on the base policies are less informative than their joint e¤ect. Studies that evaluate the impact of labor rigidities modelling one policy only will typically understate the impact of worker insurance policy choices for economic outcomes like PE investments.
This concept relates back to the policy decisions illustrated in Figure 1 . The individual policies are simultaneously capturing both the level of labor market insurance provided and the 2 mechanism used to provision the insurance. An empirical evaluation of an increase in employment protection will encompass both increases in insurance levels (e.g., Anglo-Saxon versus Continental Europe) and changes in policy mechanisms (e.g., Denmark versus Portugal). These two objects are distinct from a policy perspective, however, and it is important to distinguish their individual e¤ects as much as possible. Indeed, the simple trend lines in Figures 1-3 can look quite di¤erent when the Anglo-Saxon economies are included in the calculation. Throughout this study, we assess the impact of adjusting worker insurance policies while keeping the overall level of insurance provided by a country constant. Substantial changes in insurance levels provided by countries are quite rare, but policy makers frequently contemplate moving towards or away from ‡exible labor markets with concomitant adjustments in other insurance programs (e.g., the recent interest in the Danish model).
We show two techniques to isolate the mechanism of worker insurance provision from the overall insurance level. One approach is particularly simple, just taking the linear di¤erence of two policy coe¢ cients after a multivariate regression. A second approach transforms the base policies into more intuitive indices. Both approaches …nd that policy mechanisms are robustly important for PE investment patterns, while the overall level of labor insurance provided is of much weaker importance. This is true on both the extensive margin (i.e., whether PE investments form at all in a country-sector) and the intensive margin (i.e., the volume of deals in the country-sector). The e¤ects are particularly strong for US-sourced venture capital investments, and we show the sector-level patterns are generally robust to other policy characteristics and traits of countries.
The …ndings of this project are important for policy makers, PE investment managers, and entrepreneurs seeking high-growth opportunities. Policy choices regarding the optimal levels and mechanisms of labor market insurance are complex and should consider many economic and non-economic factors. While it is well beyond this paper's scope to determine how labor market insurance should be provisioned, we highlight one factor that should in ‡uence this decision given the desire of many European leaders to promote entrepreneurial …nancing (e.g., OECD 2004a). Many policy makers look to active policies like public venturing as a means of seeding or expanding their entrepreneurial communities (e.g., Lerner 2009 ). This work instead highlights how in ‡uential passive policies like general labor regulations are.
More broadly, this study is part of a growing body of academic and policy research examining how labor market regulations in ‡uence entrepreneurship and productivity growth. Many observers, both within and outside of academia, believe strict European labor policies hinder economic restructuring and subsequent productivity growth. The PE funds studied here support …rm creation and restructuring. As such, the …ndings of this project provide a complementary measure to studies considering entrepreneurship rates or reallocation measures directly. Moreover, our results suggest strong caution in the interpretation of previous work that …nds stronger employment protection leads to higher self-employment rates. Some take this correlation to suggest that employment protection increases entrepreneurship generally. This study …nds the opposite relationship, however, with respect to VC investments and the highgrowth entrepreneurship associated with them. This di¤erence is evident even in the simple correlations of Figures 2 and 3 . Southern European countries rank very high on self-employment scales but have smaller PE markets; the opposite is true for Scandinavian countries. There is substantial heterogeneity in the types of …rms founded and therefore in the various metrics of entrepreneurship (e.g., Glaeser and Kerr 2009 ). Understanding these variations is particularly important in evaluating how labor regulations in ‡uence entrepreneurship.
This study also has important implications for PE fund managers and the entrepreneurs they support. As background for this project, we undertook semi-structured interviews of PE professionals in ten European countries. Across respondent countries and fund types, investment managers generally believed labor regulations to be an important factor in the development of both VC and buy-out markets. Most respondents further rated local labor regulations as a …rst-order concern when evaluating investment candidates, although several noted that they were willing to enter heavily regulated markets if other advantages existed like high quality labor. One respondent even suggested that past concern over labor regulations may have hidden some high-quality opportunities in countries with heavily-regulated labor markets. 1 Our analysis provides quantitative evidence of this general pattern. Moreover, the sectorlevel specialization that we document is very important for PE placement decisions. This includes the direct labor adjustment costs of these policies for portfolio …rms, but it also extends much further. Many aspects of PE investment exhibit agglomeration or cluster economies, where larger numbers of similar …rms that are spatially proximate increase the productivity of each …rm. Some examples of these agglomeration economies include entrepreneurial awareness of PE investment models, legal and contractual support, clearly-de…ned exit opportunities, and strong local labor markets for specialized professionals. As many of these agglomeration economies are further speci…c to individual sectors, PE managers should factor in how these policy di¤erences across nations in ‡uence local investment activity. These concerns will in turn in ‡uence location choices of entrepreneurs anticipating using PE funding to support …rm creation and growth.
The next section reviews the relevant literature and theory, highlighting where our study …ts in. Section 3 introduces our data. Section 4 provides our basic empirical results that model the two labor policies directly. Section 5 then outlines a transformation of the policies to separate the levels of insurance provided from the mechanisms employed. The last section concludes.
Literature Review
This section …rst reviews the economic e¤ects of employment protection. We emphasize in particular how their impact on the labor adjustments of …rms di¤ers from LMEs, an alternative mechanism for providing worker insurance. We then describe the channels through which these hindered labor adjustments in ‡uence PE investors in particular.
Employment Protection Regulations
Theoretical models of EPRs share a common …nding that EPRs should dampen labor ‡uctuations by …rms. This unambiguous prediction contrasts with the models'di¤erent predictions regarding total employment levels and technical e¢ ciency. The …rst and unambiguous prediction is the central building block for this study.
In the standard competitive model of the labor market, EPRs are economically equivalent to mandated employment bene…ts. Bene…t mandates raise the cost of employing workers, leading to a decline in labor demand by …rms for a given wage rate. Workers will increase their labor supply at a given wage rate to the extent that they value the mandate. If workers value the mandated bene…t at its marginal cost of provision, then equilibrium employment levels are unchanged and wages fall to cover exactly the cost of the bene…t. In this scenario, the mandate is e¢ cient and the Coase theorem applies (e.g., Summers 1989 , Lazear 1990 ).
EPRs can potentially improve e¢ ciency when workers value the protections above their cost of provision. EPRs may be under-provided by the private market due to adverse selection (e.g., Aghion and Hermalin 1990, Levine 1991) and risk aversion (e.g., Bertola 2004 ). Agell (1999) discusses why eliminating EPRs may not be desirable when labor markets are subject to fairness considerations and market imperfections, while Wasmer (2006) and Macleod and Nakavachara (2007) focus on human-capital investment. In the Coasean model, these factors would lead to higher employment levels after the mandates are imposed. Many of the e¢ ciency gains in these models operate through a longer attachment of a …rm and worker.
Other common deviations, however, can yield e¢ ciency costs when EPRs are introduced. First, workers may value the mandates at less than their marginal cost of provision, leading to a weaker growth in labor supply. Equivalently, some of the termination bene…t may accrue to a third party, such as an attorney. Collective bargaining could also restrict the adjustments. In these cases, EPRs drive a wedge between the private and social cost of job separations and thereby create a deadweight loss. Because dismissal costs are only paid when workers and …rms separate, EPRs result in labor adjustment costs to …rms (i.e., a tax on separations).
Consequently, EPRs that workers value at less than their cost will inhibit e¢ cient job separations. These …ring costs, in turn, can reduce e¢ cient hiring as well for forward-looking …rms. The net e¤ect of reduced hiring and …ring is ambiguous for total employment levels and technical e¢ ciency, but overall employment volatility does unambiguously decline. 2 Within these theoretical models is a common prediction for declining …rm-level labor ‡uc-tuations due to employment protection. The existing empirical evidence, while small, supports this prediction. Autor et al. (2007) This labor adjustment cost feature of employment protection is di¤erent from LMEs, which partially substitute for EPRs in insuring workers against labor market risks. Under a balanced budget, general corporate or personal income taxation may need to be higher to support LMEs than EPRs. The direct incidence of the collective taxation on …rm labor adjustments, however, will be weaker in regimes favoring LMEs over employment protection. Thus, …rms and industries with high inherent labor volatility are disadvantaged, ceteris paribus, when labor insurance is provisioned through employment protection. 3 It is well beyond the scope of this paper to determine either the optimal level of labor market insurance or the most appropriate technique for implementing a chosen insurance level. The political economy of employment protection is complex (e.g., Saint-Paul 2002b), and countries may have constraints on their policy choices (e.g., Algan and Cahuc 2007, Brügemann 2007 ). More importantly, the optimal insurance design may involve both policies to a degree (e.g., Blanchard and Tirole 2007, Boeri et al. 2003 ). However, we do hope to provide evidence on the economic impact of these di¤erent mechanisms, which is a …rst-order empirical concern.
Labor Rigidities and PE Firms
We speci…cally study the impact of these worker insurance policies for PE investments. There are two general ways in which labor rigidities are likely to impact PE investors. First, heavy dismissal costs may hinder the development of the high growth or rapidly restructuring sectors in which these companies specialize. Second, labor rigidities can weaken the reallocation of resources across their portfolio companies, which is necessary for their returns. We discuss each of these e¤ects below, with an initial focus on VC investments. Gompers and Lerner (2002) provide a detailed introduction to these investment models.
Recent work suggests that strict labor regulations hinder the development of high growth or rapidly restructuring sectors. This sector-level prediction is more subtle than the general prediction of declining employment ‡uctuations noted above. In these models, EPRs reduce the attractiveness of industries where substantial technical change occurs relative to more stable industries, ceteris paribus, as a given job match becomes obsolete faster (e.g. VC …rms are very sensitive to this weakening of high growth, volatile industries. Growing sectors create opportunities for the rapid development of portfolio companies along with the markets. Moreover, many screening, monitoring, and reputational features of the value-added investment model of VC …rms are most bene…cial in these settings characterized by incomplete information and uncertainty (e.g., Hsu 2004 ). VC-backed …rms can support the emergence of new technology-based industries, and the available evidence suggests that they are e¢ cient at these investments (e.g., Kortum and Lerner 2000) . We should thus anticipate weaker VC investments for high volatility sectors in the presence of strong employment protection as these policies weaken the general attractiveness of these types of industries.
In addition to this industry-level e¤ect, labor rigidities also hinder VC formation by reducing the ‡exibility of investors to reallocate resources across portfolio companies. The majority of companies in a VC portfolio fail despite the assistance extended, characteristic of most entrepreneurial and innovative endeavors. The majority of investments yield zero or negative returns, with a small number of great successes generating most of the pro…ts (e.g., Huntsman and Hoban 1980 , Sahlman 1990 , Cochrane 2005 . A successful investor needs to maintain a portfolio of projects and to reallocate resources aggressively from failing ventures to high-performing investments. This staged approach yields option values for investments, and an important role of VC investors is to close under-performing ventures for the sake of better opportunities. These economics also underlie many of the legal and structural VC features like syndication, convertible securities, and control rights (e.g., Kaplan and Strömberg 2003) .
Strict EPRs increase the costs of these adjustments and the closures of under-performing ventures. Importantly, this negative e¤ect is due to the incidence of the taxation, rather than the level of labor insurance provided. All else being equal, a higher provision of public insurance may aid high growth, volatile …rms by reducing the compensating di¤erentials required for employees to accept the greater job uncertainty. Stronger unemployment insurance bene…ts and LMEs can even subsidize volatile sectors when paid for through general taxation. The central question is how the chosen insurance mechanisms shape the costs …rms bear when adjusting employment. This motivates our comparison of employment protection and LMEs; it further motivates our e¤orts to separate the levels and mechanisms e¤ects.
Strict employment regulations are likely to hinder the development of buy-out investors too, but for somewhat di¤erent reasons than VC investments. Buy-out investments are much more concentrated in manufacturing and industrial products and services than VC investments; hightech sectors accounted for only 10% of European buy-out investments in 2000. Moreover, buyout investors do not target rapid growth for their portfolio …rms like VC …rms. Nevertheless, buyout investors seek opportunities that frequently require labor restructurings. Past employment obligations generally transfer to new owners (e.g., a transfer of undertaking). If labor regulations increase the cost of these existing contracts and their duties, the gap between current valuations and potential worth must be larger to induce a takeover and restructuring.
Despite these theoretical linkages, our understanding of how labor regulations shape PE investment is still developing. Much of the literature focuses on the role of ‡exible labor markets and non-compete clauses in the spatial distribution of the US high-tech industry. 5 Jeng and Wells (2000) …rst empirically evaluated VC development across countries using multivariate analyses. In cross-sectional analyses, they …nd strict labor regulations (modeled using labor market tenures) hindered early-stage VC investment but not later-stage investments. In a subsequent study of the cyclicality of the VC industry, Romain and van Pottelsberghe (2004) …nd that labor market rigidities (modeled through EPR indices) reduce the impact of a country's expansions in GDP or technical knowledge for concomitant growth in its VC industry. 6 The empirical evidence for industry-level di¤erences due to worker insurance policies is even rarer. The paper closest in spirit to ours is Da Rin et al. (2006) . In a very interesting paper, the authors …nd within-country variations of manager's perceptions of hiring and …ring conditions (modeled through IMD management surveys) reduce the ratio of high-tech funding to total PE investments. Given the interests of their study, they do not pursue this angle further. Two papers from the broader economics literature are also relevant for this topic. Micco and Pagés (2007) …nd that stringent employment protection reduces the sizes of sectors characterized by high intrinsic labor volatility. Moreover, employment ‡uctuations in these volatile sectors is dampened. Cuñat and Melitz (2007) further relate more ‡exible labor markets to comparative advantages in trade for industries with high labor volatility. Empirical evidence on this prediction is just emerging, and our study contributes evidence from PE placements. We also hope to draw attention to the levels versus mechanism e¤ects.
Data Preparation
This section describes our data sources. We begin with our data on labor market policies. We then document the PE data used to measure our dependent variables. We …nally discuss our measurement of the inherent volatilities of di¤erent industries.
Labor Market Insurance Policies
Our EPR index is sourced from the OECD (2004b) with a theoretical range from zero to …ve. Higher EPR scores indicate more heavily regulated labor markets, factoring in a wide variety of legislation concerning the individual and collective dismissals of both temporary and regular workers. In practice, the lowest score in 1998 is the US at 0.2, while Turkey is judged to have the most stringent restrictions at 3.8. Table 1 documents the index for our European sample. Switzerland (1.1), Denmark (1.4), and Portugal (3.7) are the extreme values for 1998 within the Continental Europe sample. The UK (0.6) and Ireland (0.9) provide intermediate levels between the US (0.2) and the most ‡exible labor markets in Continental Europe. Most countries either receive the same EPR rating in 1990 and 1998 or move toward more ‡exible labor markets, especially for temporary workers. Only France increases its protection, from 2.7 to 3.0.
LMEs are taken from the OECD Social Expenditures database and include unemployment insurance bene…ts and active labor market policy expenditures. Unemployment insurance comprises approximately 60% of the total, with this share declining somewhat in recent years. Active labor market programs include all social expenditures, excepting education, that are designed to improve the bene…ciaries'prospects for …nding employment or increasing earnings. Examples include labor market training, school-to-work transition assistance for youth, and labor market programs to promote employment for the unemployed. Table 1 , it should be noted that a number of zeros are small investment levels that appear zero on a per capita basis. 7 The central advantage of the EVCA data are their fairly consistent measurement of PE markets across European countries and industrial sectors during the 1990-2004 period. This consistency for innovative sectors is substantially better than most other sources of economic data. There are, however, two liabilities that directly in ‡uence our empirical approach. First, VC and buy-out investments are separately reported at the aggregate level but not within sectors. This is unfortunate as many of the rationales in the previous section would suggest a stronger impact for VC investors than buy-out …rms, and we would prefer to quantify these di¤erences.
Second, the EVCA data do not allow us to consider cross-border investments within Europe. Approximately 75% of European PE investments recorded by the EVCA are raised within the investing country (an unweighted average across countries). Our EVCA data report the amounts invested abroad by European countries, but the destination countries are not identi…ed. Again, this distinction is not made at the sector level either. We focus on the investment amounts for countries in this paper.
We also look at US-based investments into Europe using data taken from Thomson Financial's Venture Economics (VE) database. The EVCA surveys all PE …rms with a physical presence in Europe, regardless of EVCA membership status. VE contains deal-level data for US PE …rms that allow us to tally investments originating in the US for European portfolio …rms. In some cases, the US PE …rms may have opened o¢ ces in Europe, although this practice was not common until the end of our sample. The US data are thus important for providing a comprehensive view of the emergence of European PE markets.
Moreover, the US-sourced investments provide several methodological advantages. Most importantly, aggregating from individual deals allows us to separate VC and buy-out investments by country and sector for US investments into Europe, a joint disaggregation not feasible with the EVCA data. Second, these cross-border investments are less in ‡uenced than domestic European investments by unmodeled factors like public venturing. Finally, these cross-border investments are a recent phenomena, largely coming about during the last decade, long after labor insurance policies have been devised. This timing aids in assigning causal directions to the analyses.
One liability of the VE data is that investment amounts are missing from about 30% of the reported deals. For this reason, much of our analyses below focus on the count of deals by country-sector, which we can identify consistently in both data sources. To analyze the overall value of the PE markets, we impute the missing VE values through a two-step procedure. 8 This imputation is mainly for descriptive purposes and of limited analytical consequence. We note where a deviation occurs as we present the results, and the use of imputed data is always in the direction of making our results more conservative.
Finally, it is important to note that substantive di¤erences exist between the PE-supported entrepreneurship studied here and entrepreneurship de…ned through self employment. The survey by Addison and Teixeira (2003) notes a consistent empirical …nding of a positive association between stronger employment protection and self-employment rates. Table 1 suggests that this relationship is unlikely to hold in estimations of cross-country PE di¤erences within Europe. Southern European countries like Portugal and Greece rank very high on self-employment scales but have smaller PE per capita markets. On the other hand, Scandinavian countries rank low on self-employment indices, but have been among the most successful European countries in attracting VC and buy-out investments. 9 
Sector Labor Volatilities
Our analysis centers on di¤erences across industries in inherent labor volatilities in an empirical framework similar to Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Carlin and Mayer (2003) . Measuring the inherent labor volatilities, as opposed to the realized labor volatilities by country and sector, is important given that labor regulations directly in ‡uence realized employment ‡ows. We model these inherent volatilities using US labor turnover calculated from the Longitudinal Business Database (LBD). We take the labor volatility of …rms in the US to be the most unconstrained as in Figure 1 . In a hypothetical industry with no inherent labor volatility, we would not expect signi…cant di¤erences across European regimes. Employment dismissal costs are likely to be more binding, however, in sectors where the US demonstrates substantial labor churn. Under some conditions, these sector-level di¤erences are augmented by the general equilibrium e¤ects of comparative advantage and trade.
Sourced from US tax records and Census Bureau surveys, the LBD provides annual observations for every private-sector establishment with payroll from 1976 onwards. In 1997, the data include 108 million workers and 5.8 million establishments. Each establishment is given a unique, time-invariant identi…er that can be longitudinally tracked. Second, the LBD assigns …rm identi…ers that facilitate the linkages of establishments. Davis et al. (1996) and Kerr and Nanda (2009) further describe these data. Our primary measure of labor volatility is the absolute employment change of an establishment e in year t from the previous year, ABS e;t = jE e;t E e;t 1 j (E e;t + E e;t 1 ) =2 ;
where E is the employee count of the establishment. We calculate ABS at the establishment level, versus the …rm level, to allow the most accurate sector assignments possible. This measure is bounded between zero and two and reduces the impact of outliers. Autor et al. (2007) further motivate the ABS metric of labor volatility and relate it to the reallocation metrics developed by Davis et al. (1996) .
After calculating ABS at the establishment-year level, we take the mean across establishments within each sector over the 1977-1999 period. We denote this sector-level mean as Labor U S s . We also calculate a second version of ABS at the sector level for 1992-1999 (i.e., net employment changes at the sector-year level). These two metrics have a 0.73 correlation across industries. We …nd consistent results across a range of approaches and time periods for calculating US labor volatility, and we report these two as representative cases.
As the LBD classi…es establishments with the SIC4 framework, we develop concordances that link the EVCA sectors, VE technology codes, and the US SIC system. 
Empirical Results with Base Policies
We have two predictions to test. Our …rst hypothesis is that countries providing worker insurance through LMEs versus employment protection will have comparatively stronger PE development in sectors characterized by high intrinsic labor volatility. Our second and related hypothesis is that the mechanism used to provision worker insurance is more important for these placement patterns than the absolute level of worker insurance provided. This section con…rms the …rst prediction with country-sector regressions that model the base policies. We introduce a simple linear test in a multivariate framework that is comparable to previous studies. We analyze the second prediction in the next section after transforming the base policies.
Empirical Speci…cation
Our basis speci…cation takes the form,
We use this empirical framework to test separately both the extensive and intensive margins of PE investment by country-sector. In extensive margin frameworks, P E c;s is a dichotomous indicator variable for PE investment in country c and sector s in the 1990-2004 period. The dependent variables in the intensive margin estimations are the log counts and value of PE investments by country-sector. We also discuss average deal sizes.
Multiple country-sector observations receive very small investments over the period studied. Accordingly, we de…ne the entry threshold for extensive margin analyses as annual PE investment of one Euro/ECU per capita in the sector. In the EVCA, 56% of domestic-sourced PE observations at the country-sector level achieve this investment threshold. For US-sourced PE investments, 21% of VC and 23% of buy-out observations reach this level. This threshold mainly in ‡uences the domestic-sourced entry calculation, as every country-sector combination has at least a trace amount of investment over the 1990-2004 period in the EVCA data. The results presented below are generally robust to adjusting this threshold amount so long as a meaningful degree of variation remains.
For explanatory variables, we interact the two labor market policies, EP R c and LM E c , with the sector-level US labor volatility metric Labor U S s . LM E c is the log value of LMEs per capita.
c and s are vectors of country and sector …xed e¤ects, respectively. Country …xed e¤ects absorb the main e¤ects of the labor market policies, while sector …xed e¤ects absorb the main e¤ects of Labor U S s . As these …xed e¤ects also control for overall European PE investment behavior by country and sector, we only exploit residual variation for identi…cation. The explanatory variables are transformed to have unit standard deviation for interpretation. Estimations are weighted by an interaction of country population with total sector size across countries. The interaction of 15 countries and 14 sectors yields 210 observations per regression on the extensive margin. Intensive margin analyses are conducted over country-sector observations where positive investments exist. Table 3 presents the results for domestic PE investments. The …rst two columns are extensive margin analyses, while the last four columns document the intensive margin estimations. Dependent variables are indicated by column headers. The …rst column for each outcome measure uses the establishment-level calculation of US labor volatility; the second column employs the sector-level calculation. While some minor di¤erences emerge within these pairs, the results are generally robust to the volatility calculation employed.
Domestic European Investments
Focusing on Columns 1 and 2 of Table 3 , we …nd a negative EP R elasticity in both models. This suggests that employment rigidities lower PE investment entry in volatile sectors, but the results are not very strong or conclusive. On the other hand, the LM E coe¢ cient is positive and indicative of stronger labor market insurance expenditures increasing PE investment in volatile sectors. Both elasticities are statistically signi…cant at a 90% con…dence level. Based upon these elasticities, one might conclude that labor policies are only marginally important for the entry of domestic PE …rms. Yet, the introduction and Figure 1 emphasize how these policies are jointly chosen. This suggests that their joint strength may be more important than their partial elasticities.
To test this, we begin with a conceptual model where the level of worker insurance provided is determined by g(EP R; LM E) = EP R EP R c + LM E LM E c . This g( ) function assumes the two policies are additive and separable, and the alphas weight the importance of each policy for worker insurance. Consider the scenario where a policy maker seeks to maintain a level of insurance I but to move from an EPR-based regime to greater LMEs. Holding I constant and assuming relationship (2) is correctly de…ned, the comparative static for moving along the insurance mechanism frontier de…ned in g( ) for its impact on PE investment is P E = LM E EP R ( LM E = EP R ):
The bottom of Table 3 presents this comparative static with g( ) de…ned by LM E = EP R . This equal contribution of EPRs and LMEs to worker insurance is motivated by the policy trade-o¤ within Continental Europe in Figure 1 . The linear combinations of LM E EP R are much more stable and well measured than the individual policies are. The joint test suggests that a one standard deviation change from employment protection towards LMEs is associated with an 8% higher probability of PE entry for sectors with high labor volatility compared to sectors with low volatility. In a much clearer way than the individual policies do, this joint e¤ect con…rms the importance of the mechanism used to provision labor insurance on the pattern of PE placements. The implied magnitude of a contemplated policy reform is also twice as large.
The next two columns consider the intensive margin of PE entry through the log counts of investments. The sample size remains the same as the …rst two columns since at least one deal is observed for every country-sector in the EVCA data. The individual interactions of both policies are now larger and statistically signi…cant. Their joint e¤ect again suggests that a policy movement along the insurance frontier will have twice the e¤ect that the individual coe¢ cients would suggest. Comparing Columns 3 and 4, the measured joint elasticity is also more stable than the individual policy coe¢ cients. This greater stability for the linear di¤erence compared to the levels of the underlying coe¢ cients is repeatedly observed in our analysis.
A one standard deviation policy adjustment by a nation towards LMEs from employment protection is associated with 20% more deals in high labor volatility industries compared to low volatility industries. While this numerical value is larger than the entry probability adjustment of 8%, the earlier 8% e¤ect is larger in terms of the underlying variation in the data. The contemplated policy adjustment is associated with a 0.2 standard deviation change in entry levels and a 0.13 standard deviation change in investment magnitudes. Both margins are thus important.
Finally, the last two columns of Table 3 …nd similar e¤ects for log investment levels. Comparing Columns 3 and 4 with Columns 5 and 6 would suggest that as deal counts grow, average deal sizes slightly decline. This pattern would be expected in many investment selection models, but the declines in average deal size are quite small and one cannot reject the null hypothesis of constant average deal size. The impact of the labor policy environment thus appears stronger on the number of domestic deals undertaken (i.e., market formation and size) versus deal size. 10 
US-Sourced Investments
To complement Table 3 's domestic analysis, Table 4 examines US-sourced investments into Europe. Panel A provides results for venture capital placements, and Panel B documents buyout investments. These US-based investments were very trivial at the start of the sample period, but grew remarkably after 1990. The patterns of overseas placements, coming well after basic labor policies were established, thus aid in a causal interpretation of the …ndings. As noted in the data description, US-based investors are also less likely to be in ‡uenced by public venturing and similar industrial policies, which we have not yet controlled for in the analysis.
The pattern in Panel A is very similar to Table 3 's domestic analysis. The entry probability is 8%-9% higher, and investment counts are 25% higher. The sizes of the two e¤ects are comparable to the underlying data at approximately 0.2 standard deviations. There is some evidence of larger investment sizes in this context, but the precision of the underlying average deal size e¤ect again does not yield a conclusive …nding regarding deal traits. 11 The pattern for buy-out investors, however, is somewhat di¤erent. We again see evidence for greater investment counts in volatile sectors as policies shift away from employment protection. The magnitude, however, is half of the comparable e¤ect for US-sourced VC placements. This diminished impact is true in both reported elasticities and in comparison to the underlying data variation. There is also no evidence for an entry margin e¤ect. In fact, both policies have negative elasticities, a point to which we return in the next section when discussing the level of labor market insurance. Finally, there is perhaps the best evidence for a change in investment size with respect to these buy-out placements. While interesting, we again cannot reject the null hypothesis that deal size is una¤ected.
Overall, Table 4 …nds fairly consistent evidence that US-sourced VC placements are quite sensitive to these labor insurance policies, while buy-out investors are less in ‡uenced. It is likely that a similar pattern would hold if we could disaggregate domestic-sourced PE investments. While we cannot directly undertake this test, we do know at the national level from the EVCA data the share of domestic PE investments that are buy-out investments. Unreported estimations …nd that the measured labor policy e¤ect is higher in countries with smaller buy-out shares than in those with larger buy-out communities. We hope that future studies can develop data to con…rm this suggestive e¤ect.
Taken as a whole, Tables 3 and 4 support the hypothesis that labor insurance mechanisms matter. E¤ects of these policy choices are stronger in sectors with greater labor volatility, measured through the relatively unconstrained US case, than those with weaker labor turnover. We provide further robustness checks on this pattern at the end of the next section, but we next turn to transformation of the underlying policies that are easier to interpret.
Empirical Results with Transformed Policies
The previous section highlights that incorporating base labor market policies directly into regressions captures both di¤erences across nations in the level of labor insurance provided and di¤erences in the technique employed. Our proposed linear test provides a more consistent estimator, but the ideal estimation would separately quantify both traits as they are distinct from a policy perspective. While both traits are exceptionally complex and multi-dimensional, this section develops simple proxies de…ned as LbrInsLevel c and LbrInsM ech c . These transformations are used to test our second hypothesis that the insurance mechanism is more important for PE development and specialization than the overall insurance level.
Policy Transformations
To calculate LbrInsLevel c and LbrInsM ech c , we …rst transform EP R c and LM E c to have zero mean and unit standard deviation. The resulting metrics are less dependent upon the scale through which they are originally measured. We then measure the single-dimension distance for each policy from the lowest observed values in the OECD sample (i.e., US in employment protection, Greece in LMEs per capita). Both of these distances have a maximum of less than four standard deviations. We calculate LbrInsLevel c as the average of these distances for each observation. This level index estimates in standard deviations the distance from a country's joint provision of (EPR, LME) to the lowest observed values in the OECD. Table 1 documents these values, and the vertical axis of Figure 4 plots these distance metrics. The UK provides the weakest labor market insurance measured through this technique, followed by Ireland and Switzerland. Belgium, Denmark, and Sweden are among the highest insurance levels.
The second metric, LbrInsM ech c , describes the mechanism employed for providing this labor market insurance. It is a radian measure of the LME distance divided by the EPR distance. LbrInsM ech c can be thought of as the slope of a ray extending from the origin of Figure 1 to the nation's position in (EPR, LME) space. The radian measure is a simple monotonic transformation of the base distance ratio that is bounded by [0; =2]. This transformation eliminates the asymmetry that arises with a simple ratio. Larger values of LbrInsM ech c indicate greater reliance on LMEs than EPRs for providing worker insurance. Portugal, Italy, and Spain are the lowest values, indicating very strong dependency on employment protection, while Denmark, Switzerland, Ireland, and the UK most emphasize LMEs. The values are again listed in Table 1 and are plotted as the horizontal axis of Figure 4 . Figure 4 is very ‡at, illustrating better than Figure  1 the empirical substitution of European economies between LMEs and EPRs for the provision of labor insurance. This approximate orthogonality of the two indices for Continental Europe is not by construction but instead the result of selected policy levels. Including Ireland and the UK in the trend line results in a negative correlation of about -0.4. In words, countries providing higher levels of labor market insurance tend to employ more stringent employment protection when the Anglo-Saxon economies are incorporated. Within Continental Europe itself, however, there is no clear relationship between the estimated level of labor insurance provided and the mechanisms employed.
The trend line for Continental Europe in
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Tables 5 presents our domestic analyses with these transformed policy variables in a framework similar to speci…cation (2). As would be expected, our results for labor mechanism index closely parallel the estimates discussed in Table 3 . We again …nd strong evidence that labor insurance policies tilted away from employment protection are associated with stronger PE entry and investment levels in more volatile sectors. The transformation of the underlying policies makes the results easier to interpret.
Our proposed transformation also allows us to assess the relative importance of the total level of worker insurance provided as opposed to the policy mechanism used to implement it. The levels coe¢ cients in Table 5 are uniformly smaller than the mechanism coe¢ cients. When employing sector-level labor volatility measures, the elasticities for insurance levels are statistically di¤erent from zero and suggest that higher levels of insurance, conditional on the mechanism employed, promote more PE investment in more volatile sectors. The positive e¤ects using the establishment-level volatility calculation, however, are not statistically di¤erent from zero.
Tables 6 presents our analyses of US-sourced investments with these transformed policy variables. The patterns for US-sourced VC investments are very strong with respect to insurance mechanisms. On the other hand, the levels of worker insurance provided do not appear to in ‡uence these investors. Buy-out investors again behave di¤erently with respect to the entry margin and similarly in terms of investment counts. Our evidence suggests that the entry of buy-out …rms is negatively in ‡uenced by the level of labor insurance provided, even after controlling for the mechanism used to implement it. This was re ‡ected in Table 4 's …nding that both base policies had a negative elasticity for buy-out entry. We do not have a strong rationale for this e¤ect, and we hope that others evaluate whether this …nding holds more generally.
We thus conclude that the mechanism used to provide worker insurance is the more important attribute for PE investors. The evidence suggests that the absolute level of insurance provision can have a positive or negative e¤ect depending upon investment type and margin analyzed. 12 12 Our discussion also suggests a broader prediction that PE investment for a country as a whole will be 18 Table 7 provides some basic robustness checks on our speci…cation design. We report the patterns for the EVCA domestic inventors, with the US-based investments showing comparable sensitivities. Panel A repeats the base estimation for convenience.
Robustness Checks
Panel B incorporates additional national policies to test whether the insurance mechanism index is simply re ‡ecting other policies that encourage PE formation. Similar to the main regressors, these additional policies are interacted with US labor volatility by sector. As discussed above, we also control for the share of buy-out investment in the country. The unreported coe¢ cients for these additional explanatory variables are mostly small and insigni…cant. This would be expected due to the conditional interaction of the policies with industry labor volatility. The mechanism results are broadly robust to these additional interactions, while the estimated levels coe¢ cients shrink towards no e¤ect. 13 Panel C incorporates interactions of two other traits, the national population and the national GDP per capita. The results of this test are a bit more mixed. The PE entry e¤ect due to labor insurance mechanisms decline somewhat in economic magnitude and becomes statistically insigni…cant due to larger standard errors. On the other hand, the intensive margin regressions maintain much of their economic size and statistical strength. 2004) …nd that legal origins explain more of the existing di¤erences in labor regulations across countries than recent political outcomes. Given these deep antecedents, we include indicator variables for whether countries are of Germanic, Scandinavian, or UK legal origin, with stronger when worker insurance policies favor LMEs over employment protection, conditional on the level of worker insurance provided. This prediction is similar in spirit to Figures 2 and 3 , but accounts for joint policy determination and is invariant to including Anglo-Saxon nations. We …nd this prediction to be true, but these results are subject to typical concerns of a cross-sectional analysis with country-level observations. These results are available upon request. 13 Further speci…cations verify the robustness of the results to including metrics of product market regulations, collective bargaining, government ownership of banks, total government expenditures per capita, average education levels, technology opportunities modeled through patents issued by the European Patent O¢ ce, and the level of captive investments. the reference category being French/Spanish. The legal origin dummies partly act as regionindustry …xed e¤ects, too. These controls further emphasize the mechanism e¤ect, suggesting that insurance policy variations are important even within nations of similar legal origin. 14 
Alternative Mechanism Designs
In addition to the robustness check described in Table 7 , we also tested several modi…cations to our index design. We …nd similar outcomes when replacing LbrInsM ech c , which employs a bounded radian measure of policy ratios, with a simple ratio of policy distances. Likewise, we …nd similar results when modelling the overall insurance level through Euclidean distances rather than linear distances. The Euclidean distance can be thought of as the length of a ray from the origin of Figure 1 to the nation's position in (EPR, LME) space. The estimated importance of how labor insurance is provisioned is robust to both of these index variants, and this stability holds for the other empirical …ndings of this paper.
One natural question is whether EPRs and LMEs should be weighted equally in determining the labor insurance level. We are only aware of one study that attempts to estimate LM E and EP R directly. Clark and Postel-Vinay (2009) empirically evaluate whether EPRs or unemployment insurance bene…ts (UIBs, the largest portion of LME) better promote job security as measured through the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) surveys. Strikingly, these authors …nd that EPRs do not raise worker perceptions of security; if anything, Clark and Postel-Vinay's (2009) estimates imply stricter EPRs lower perceived labor market insurance by private-sector workers. On the other hand, UIBs robustly increase perceived insurance.
As a …nal index variant, we used Clark and Postel-Vinay's coe¢ cients to weight an alternative g(:) function that replaces LbrInsLevel c . The importance of LbrInsM ech c continues to hold, whereas the level of insurance proxied by the worker security perception further weakens as a predictor. This heavy weighting of the LMEs versus employment protection does, however, make it more di¢ cult to separate the two e¤ects when many covariate interactions are included. This nonetheless reinforces the emphasis, both here and in Clark and Postel-Vinay (2009), on the importance of insurance mechanisms.
Ultimately, there is no single approach for estimating the level of labor market insurance. While employment protection and LMEs are likely the two most important policy levers for providing labor insurance, other techniques do exist. Moreover, the outcome measures could be extended from policy choices or worker security perceptions to other economic data (e.g., worker income stability, job loss and gain rates). To some degree, the weighting employed will always involve normative values as well as positive models, and these values di¤er within and across societies (e.g., Kerr 2007 ).
Nevertheless, we believe LbrInsM ech c captures a meaningful, …rst-order policy trade-o¤ that is evident empirically and grounded in theory (e.g., Pissarides 2001, Blanchard and Tirole 2007). The conclusion of this study is that the mechanism used to provision labor market insurance is important for PE formation. We are unable to draw consistent conclusions regarding the level of insurance provided except that it is of lesser importance than the mechanism. The transformed variables demonstrate the mechanism's importance in an intuitive manner. We hope that future research will further re…ne our understanding of the g(:) function's structure.
Conclusions
European economies empirically substitute between employment protection regulations and labor market expenditures (e.g., unemployment insurance bene…ts, job transition assistance) as mechanisms for providing worker security. A growing body of theoretical and empirical evidence …nds employment protections act as a tax on …rm adjustments, while the incidence of labor expenditures on this margin is less direct. Many European policy makers and business leaders want to replicate US venture capital and buy-out communities in their home countries. Both of these private equity groups, however, operate in dynamic environments that require frequent adjustments of the labor forces of their portfolio companies. Their business models make these investors very sensitive to strict labor regulations.
We …nd that worker insurance policies favoring labor expenditures over employment protection encourage greater private equity entry and larger investment levels. This is true for both domestic investors and US-inbound venture capital investments. This e¤ect is conditional on the level of worker insurance provided, which is of lesser importance for private equity patterns than the policy mechanisms employed. Policy choices regarding the optimal levels and mechanisms of labor market insurance are complex and should consider many economic and non-economic factors. This study highlights one factor that should in ‡uence the trade-o¤ between employment protection and labor market expenditures. Level and Mechanism Indices of Labor Market Insurance are transformations of the EPR and LME policies. The Level Index estimates the joint insurance provided through these two policies; higher values indicate greater worker insurance provision. The Mechanism Index estimates the relative importance of the two policies; higher values indicate greater reliance on LMEs versus EPRs in the provision. EPRs and the log value of LMEs per capita are transformed to have zero mean and unit standard deviation. Univariate distances are measured from the lowest provision of each policy among the reporting countries (US EPR, Greece LME). The Level Index averages these univariate distances. The Mechanism Index is the radian measure of the transformed LME to EPR ratio. Regressions include country and sector fixed effects, are weighted by country populations interacted with aggregate sector size, and report robust standard errors. The bottom row presents the linear difference βLME-βEPR and its standard error. This difference approximates a policy change that holds the level of worker insurance provided constant but adjusts the insurance mechanism from EPRs towards LMEs. 
